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Case No. 14583 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent Centurian Corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as "Centurian", brought this action alleging breach of 
contract for the purchase and sale of goods. Defendant-Appellant 
Fiberchem, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "Fiberchem", denied 
the contract and asserted an affirmative defense of alter ego 
asserting the check delivered to it was for payment on the account 
of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "Boats". 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for the Third Judicial District in 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson presiding, granted plaintiff judgment in the amount of 
$3,300,00 together with interest and costs. Defendant's defense 
of alter ego and counterclaim based upon alter ego, was dismissed 
for lack of evidence to support fraud or trickery and further 
Fiberchem had actual knowledge of the former business being 
defunct, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Centurian seeks an order of this Court affirming the 
judgment rendered by the trial court, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FiberchemTs "Statement of Facts" is so distorted and 
does not reflect the findings of the Lower Court that Centurian 
is compelled to accurately state the facts as they are, 
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,, a Utah corporation, which 
later changed its name to Centurian Boats, Inc,, was incorporated 
on October 1M-, 1968 (Ex, 11-d), Thereafter until January 22, 1972 
Centurian Boats, Inc, engaged in the manufacture of boats and had 
some 20 to 30 employees. On January 22, 1972 a fire occurred at 
the plant of Centurian Boats, Inc,, which completely destroyed 
the plant and terminated all activity of Centurian Boats, Inc, 
(R, 91). 
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Fiberchem had, prior to the fire, sold to Centurian 
Boats, Inc. on open account goods and materials from its in-
ception to the date of the fire (R. 198), After the fire in 
January, 1972 Fiberchem did not sell to either Centurian, Inc. 
or Centurian Boats, Inc. any materials and/or goods until 
August, 1973 (R. 200). 
Approximately two weeks before August 1, 1973, Cen-
turian through Richard Nickles, called Fiberchem and asked to 
order some resin and cloth. Thereafter Mr, Nickles delivered 
CenturianTs check xvith its accompanying voucher, (Exs. 1-P and 
2-P) to Fiberchem (R. 94, 135 and 136). Mr. Schwab, Fiberchem's 
manager, acknowledged receipt of Exhibit 1-P and forwarded the 
check to Seattle (R. 184-185). 
Centurian never did receive the materials ordered and 
Fiberchem applied Exhibit 1-P on Centurian Boats, Inc. old account 
which had been written off. Repeated demands were made upon 
Fiberchem for delivery of the goods ordered on August 1, 1973 
via telephone (R. 95, 96). Finally on January 25, 1974- Centurian 
Corporation wrote Fiberchem informing Fiberchem that a legal 
action would be commenced (Ex. 13-d). 
Centurian Corporation was organized August 1, 1969 
(Ex, 12-d) and was a "holding" company organized to purchase 
-3-
After the fire in 
real estate and later molds and jigs. In the fall of 1973 Cen-
turian attempted to get into limited production of boats for 
the first time (R, 93), Centurian historically has kept separate 
books and records and has had a different tax number from that of 
Centurian Boats, Inc, (Ex, 7-P). The Companies have had different 
stockholders and at the critical time Centi[irianrs controlling 
owners were other persons that Richard Nickles (R, 114-, 115; Ex, 
6-P, 7-P and 19-P), Centurian Boats, Inc,*s quarterly returns 
reflected a number of employees (Ex, 19-P) \ while showing a gross 
sales of $472,84-8, during 1969 (Ex, 6-P), 
January, 1972, Centurian Boats, Inc, was allowed to die a natural 
death (R, 110, 111), 
Fiberchem admitted the contract (between the parties 
(R, 200) and further that Exhibit 8-P was a true and correct 
billing for goods and services purchased by Centurian Custom 
Boats, Inc, (R, 30), Monthly billings were received by Centurian 
Custom Boats, Inc, from Fiberchem showing all purchases to be 
billed to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc, (Ex,| 8-P; R, 98, 212-213), 
Fiberchem had actual knowledge of the fire, that Centurian 
Custom Boats, Inc, was out of business front and after the fire, 
that no order for materials had been received from the date of 
the fire through August 1973, and that Fiberchem had written 
the Centurian Custom Boats, Inc, account off as a bad debt on 
July 13, 1973 (R. 198-202). Finally, Fiberchem failed to take 
any action on its part to ascertain who the|y were dealing with, 
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itfhile Mr, Schwab personally advised Mr. Nickles on setting up 
Centurian Corporation, (R, 96, 203, 141-1M-2, 198), 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
AWARDING JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF 
AND DENYING DEFENDANTS 
DEFENSE OF ALTER EGO, 
Appellant asserts that this case involves the believ-
ability of the i^itnesses. This proposition is not only erroneous 
but a complete misstatement of the law. In Bramel v Utah State 
Road Commission, 24- Ut 2d 50, M-65 P2d 53M- (1970) the rule on 
appellate review is clearly enunciated by the following language 
found at page 52 of the Utah Reporter: 
"It is sometimes stated that the rule 
on appellate review is that we survey 
the evidence in light most favorable to 
the prevailing party. But this is not 
true where the court has made express 
findings otherwise. The fundamental 
rule on this aspect of procedure is that 
it is the trial judgeTs prerogative to 
find the facts; and this includes judg-
ing the credability of the witnesses 
and the evidence, and drawing whatever 
reasonable inferences may fairly be de-
rived therefrom. It is therefore more 
accurate to say that on review we sur-
vey the evidence in light favorable to 
the findings, whichever party they may 
favor; and that they will not be dis-
turbed or appealed if they are supported 
by substantial evidence," 
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The record discloses that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment 
based solely on the testimony of Mr, Fred (Schwab, the manager 
of Fiberchem, Fiberchem admitted all of the purchases through 
January 1972 were for the rrBoatTr company a^ nd not Centurian by 
the following Request for Admission: 
"Admit that Exhibit ?BT (Exhibit 8-P) 
attached hereto is a true and correct 
copy of the billings for gofDds and 
services purchased by CentuScian Custom 
Boats5 Inc, through and inclusive of 
dates on said Exhibit, 
ANSWER: Admitted," (R, 30J), 
Fred Schwab received the check from Centurian and 
forwarded it to the Seattle office, Mr, S<fchwab was not certain 
whether the stub of the check was attached^ but did declare that 
"in the normal course of events he would have forwarded the whole 
thing to Seattle" (R, 184-185), 
Mr, Schwab admitted to at least one telephone conver-
sation in which demand was made by Centurion for the delivery of 
the materials (R, 196-197) , while Mr, Nicklies testified of several 
telephone conversations, wherein demand for the product had been 
made (R. 95-96), Both parties agree that the letter, Exhibit 
13-d, was sent by Centurian and received by Fiberchem, Fiber-
chem admitted that the materials ordered wei?e never delivered 
(R, 195-196), 
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Appellant, in view of the law which counsel for the 
Appellant acknowledges in his brief, cannot deny that there is 
substantial evidence which supports the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law of the Trial Court, 
II 
THE RECORD IS VOID OF ANY 
EVIDENCE OF FRAUD OR TRICKERY 
It is asserted that the Trial Court applied the wrong 
standard to establish the defense of alter ego. The Trial Court 
in the Memorandum Decision stated there was: 
TT
. . .no showing of fraud or any other 
evidence of trickery or intent to confuse 
the defendant. Secondly, the order was 
placed by the plaintiff over a year after 
Centurian Custom Boats had ceased to do 
business, and the defendant, through its 
agents, was well aware of the fact that 
Centurian Custom Boats had ceased to do 
business. Thirdly, the account of Cen-
turian Custom Boats had been written off 
prior to the issuance of the check and 
fourthly, the defendant never attempted 
to determine the existence of two corpor-
ations." (R. 56) 
Even a casual review of the cases cited and relied upon 
by Appellant disclosed that the Trial Court was correct in the 
application of the law. The leading case relied and cited by 
Appellant, Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88, 485, P2d 
667 declares with simplicity the rule of law by the following 
language found at page 670 of the Pacific Reporter: 
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TT
, , , (S)ome element of unfairness, some-
thing akin to fraud or deception, must be 
present in order to disregard the corpora-
te fiction.TT 
The general law is concisely st&ted in 18 AmJur 2d, 
Corporations § 1M-, page 560, wherein it is stated: 
", , , (T)he principle of piercing the fict-
ion of the corporate entity is, however, to 
be applied with great caution, and not pre-
cipitately, TT 
Again at 18 AmJur 2d, Corporations §15, page 561, it 
states: 
TT
, , , (E)ach case involving disregard of 
corporate entity must rest upon its special 
facts. The corporate entity is generally 
disregarded where it is used as a cloak or 
cover for fraud or illegality,TT 
There is no evidence of fraud o± trickery. But there is 
evidence which supports the findings of th^ Trial CourtTs Memorandum 
Decision, Fiberchem, through Fred Schwab, testified about this 
knowledge of the fire of January, 1972 which stopped the operations 
of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,: 
TTQ# (By Mr, Brown) Mr, Schwab, did you know 
the company had a fire down there in 1972? 
A, Yes. 
Q, January of T72 to August! of T73 how 
much material did they purchase from 
Fiberchem, anybody that is associated 
with Mr, Nickles purchase from you? 
A, Probably none. 
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Q. (By Mr, Brown) Did you visit their plant? 
A, When? 
Q, After the fire, 
A, I drove by and saw the damage, yes, 
Q, Was it capable of operation? 
A. No, 
Q, Pardon? 
A, Obviously, no, 
Q, So you knew they were not operating, didn*t 
you, manufacturing boats, did you not? 
A, Yes, that is correct, 
Q. You had not sold them anything up to this 
occurring conversation where Mr, Nickles 
was going to pay the $3,300,00? 
A, That is correct, 
Q, That was after a period of time where the 
account was written off as a bad debt? 
A, Yes, I~-,TT (R, 201-202) 
Again Mr, Schwab testified: 
BY MR. BROWN: 
,rQ, Mr, Schwab, who approves or disapproves 
credit for an open account, for a Fiber-
chem account? 
A, It is normally done in Seattle at that 
time. Can I say how it was done? 
Q, Done in Seattle and for a Salt Lake account. 
Did Seattle ask you to make any inquiries 
as to whom you were dealing with? 
A, Yes, 
Q, And did you comply with that? 
A, Yes, 
Q, You testified, I thought, in your direct 
examination, that the first sale to Mr, 
NicklesT associates companies, whatever 
they are, was probably in, I though, late 
in T69 or perhaps T70, is that correct? 
A. Yes, 
Q, Did you make inquiry of the Secretary of 
StateTs office at that time to determine 
what company you were dealing with? 
A, No, I did not, 
Q, In fact, you obviously were dealing with 
a company, werenTt you? 
A, Yes, 
Q, You werenTt dealing with Mr, Nickles per-
sonally, were you? 
A, No. 
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0, You had to deal with some company, but 
you didnTt call the Secretary of Staters 
office, did vou? 
A. No, 
Q, (By Mr. Brown) l\TouldnTt there have been 
that information displayed to you if you 
had called the Secretary of State? 
A. I don't know, I didn't check out like 
that, 
Q, And in fact the account was set up in 
Seattle for Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,? 
A, Yes, 
Q, And that is the way it has always been 
carried by Seattle from Day One? 
A, Yes, 
Q, To the present time? 
A, It appears to be, yes,TT (R, 197-199), 
It is apparent from the mouth of Fiberchem that there 
was no trickery or fraud, Fiberchem had knowledge of a corporate 
customer, set up the account for the proper company, to wit: 
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,, sold to Centurian Custom Boats, 
Inc,, through and inclusive of the fire. After a period of some 
eighteen months, Centurian placed an order, paid for that order, 
and never received the goods, Fiberchem attempted to apply funds 
for the new order on the Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,, account. 
Appellant cites the case of Amoss v, Bennion, 18 Utah 
2d 251, 4-20, P2d 4-7 (1966) in support of piercing the corporate 
veil based on alter ego. However, in Amoss, supra, the President 
and sole stockholder signed an agreement to sell real property 
individually as well as in his capacity as President of the 
Corporation, This Court declared: 
"Mr, Bennion later raised the question as 
to his authority to bind the corporation, 
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that technically held title to the property— 
but the record pretty clearly reflects that 
the corporation was his alter ego, he having 
full control, with no one in a position to 
object to his transactions, nor to offend 
him. We think and hold that the record in-
dicates a one-man operation and a ratificat-
ion of his actions," 
In Amoss the corporation was attempting to void the 
agreement by fraud or trickery by asserting lack of authority, 
clearly distinguishable from the instance case wherein Fiberchem 
had actual knowledge of all the transactions. 
In Western Securities Co, v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 P# 
856 (1923), the person sought to be held used a corporate structure 
for his sole benefit by declaring in his answer to the complaint 
that: 
"Said Clark informed the defendant that 
said Clark for business reasons had assumed, 
and was then using, the Western Securities 
Company as the name by which said Clark 
would frequently be known in his personal 
dealings and transactions with defendant, 
and that at the time of the dealings and 
transactions set forth in the answer, where 
the name Western Securities Company was used, 
the plaintiff and said Clark represented to 
defendant that the name Western Securities 
Company was being used as an assumed name by 
said Clark in those particular dealings and 
transactions and each of them, and it was 
understood and agreed by and between plain-
tiff and defendant and said Clark that, al-
though such dealings and transactions were 
in form dealings and transactions between 
said Western Securities Company and the 
defendant, they were, nevertheless, in fact 
dealings and transactions between said Clark 
and the defendant," 
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Again clearly distinguishable in that the parties in-
tended the transactions be treated as the transactions of Clark 
individually. 
In Stine v. Girola, 9 Utah 2d 22, 337, P2d 62 (1959) 
this Court again stressed the need for fraud or trickery by the 
following language found at page 63 of the Pacific Reporter: 
TT
, , , (A)lthough the defendant, State 
Underwriters, Inc,, is a legal entity, 
nevertheless such corporate existence 
as an entity separate and distinct from 
its shareholders may be ignored if neces-
sary to circumvent the fraudulent pur-
poses of shareholders in its organizat-
ion or management/' (Emphasis supplied) 
III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND 
A CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO. 
Fiberchem simply ignores the evidence in support of the 
Trial CourtTs judgment while asserting the evidence it deems should 
have been persuasive. This same condition existed in Omnico, supra, 
wherein this Court declared: 
TT
. .
 # (I)t seems to be another of the con-
stantly recurring situations where the 
parties, with an eye single to the right-
ness of their own contentions, each select 
and place emphasis on those aspects of the 
evidence which tend to support their own 
point of view. Inasmuch as it is a matter 
upon which reasonable minds might differ 
the traditional rule of review applies and 
is dispositive of the issue here: that it 
is the prerogative of the trial court to 
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find the facts; that in reviewing the 
record we assume that he believed and 
regarded as important and persuasive, 
those aspects of the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences fairly deducible 
therefrom which support the findings 
and judgment,TT 
Not to be repetitive or redundant, but the record 
based on FiberchemTs own admissions, clearly support the Trial 
CourtTs findings. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the Trial CourtTs findings are supported 
by the evidence and that there is no evidence in support of fraud 
or trickery to avail Fiberchem of the defense of alter ego for 
Fiberchemrs own mistake and mismanagement. It is, therefore, 
submitted that the judgment should be affirmed in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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